

# SOCIAL POLICY SCRUTINY COMMITTEE

Public Hearing – 15 October 2018

Electoral Amendment Bill 2018

## DEPARTMENT OF THE CHIEF MINISTER'S RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS FROM THE COMMITTEE

### Introduction

1. A quantitative trigger has been included in the methodology for determining when a second objection period will be required in the redistribution process, as a safeguard, to implement specific reforms suggested by the Northern Territory Election Commission (NTEC) from the *2016 Territory Election Report* (the 2016 Election Report<sup>1</sup>).
2. The proposed quantitative trigger to be included in the Electoral Amendment Bill 2018 (the Bill) is in relation to the impact on the number of electors arising from a proposed redistribution. A quantitative trigger allows for a more transparent and accountable redistribution process.
3. Recommendation 4 of the 2016 Election Report is that the two-committee structure (Redistribution Committee and Augmented Redistribution Committee) should be simplified to a one-committee structure (Redistribution Committee), with a judicial appointee as an additional member and the Chair. The 2016 Election Report described the current two-committee structure under the *Electoral Act* as 'cumbersome' and noted that it unnecessarily duplicates technical and administrative processes.
4. Recommendation 7 of the 2016 Election Report is that a second objection period should be possible if the Redistribution Committee considers the second proposed redistribution to be 'significantly different'. A second objection period was recommended to 'facilitate a transparent and consultative process'.
5. The Bill proposes that a second objection period may be called for a number of reasons, at the discretion of the Committee, including, but not limited to, community interests in each proposed division, the trend of population changes in the Northern Territory, and the physical features of each proposed division. As an additional safeguard to the public interest, a quantitative trigger relating to the change in electors associated with the proposed redistribution, has also been included.

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<sup>1</sup> Prepared by the Northern Territory Electoral Commission  
([https://ntec.nt.gov.au/\\_data/assets/pdf\\_file/0006/569742/2016\\_LA\\_election\\_report.pdf](https://ntec.nt.gov.au/_data/assets/pdf_file/0006/569742/2016_LA_election_report.pdf)).

6. The quantitative trigger has been included so that:
  - The public has the opportunity to be consulted again on a second proposed redistribution of electoral boundaries in the Northern Territory where it is statistically likely to affect them;
  - the test of what constitutes 'significantly different' in terms of the number of electors, is transparent and able to be quantified based on data available to the Redistribution Committee; and
  - there is an additional safeguard in place to offset the removal of the Augmented Redistribution Committee, which had previously provided an additional review function for the redistribution process.
7. Although a quantitative trigger relating to the impact on the number of electors is not an established precedent in other Australian jurisdictions, it is appropriate in the Northern Territory given our electoral profile, which is unique compared to other jurisdictions – with the smallest population in Australia, dispersed across a vast geography and comprising a high number of regional and remote communities.
8. In the Northern Territory, a small change to the electors included in any given division may have a significant impact on an election process (such as accessibility, voter identification and communities of interest); as well as the overall election result.
9. This is consistent with existing provisions of the *Electoral Act*, which recognises the unique context of the Northern Territory by including detailed 'objects of the redistribution' (section 139). For instance, the '*physical area of each proposed division containing rural and remote areas should be kept as small as practicable*' and '*identifiable communities should be included in only one proposed division if practicable*'. These objects remain in the Bill and are re-framed as 'principles of redistribution' which the Redistribution Committee must have regard to (section 139A).

1. The Electoral Commissioner raised concerns about the practical application of proposed section 145B(1) regarding inviting objections to the second proposed redistribution. The Committee understands that a second objection period is provided for in the Commonwealth *Electoral Act* and equivalent legislation in the ACT, NSW and Victoria. However, in each case, the decision as to whether a second objection period is warranted is at the discretion of the independent redistribution committees rather than a prescribed quantitative trigger as proposed in the Bill.

a. *In the absence of any precedents elsewhere in Australia, on what basis was it determined that the decision regarding whether or not a second objection period is required should be prescribed by a quantitative trigger?*

### Key points

- The quantitative trigger relating to the impact on the number of electors is only one reason why the Committee might invite a second round of objections. The proposed Bill also provides discretion for the Committee to invite a second round of objections based on a range of factors, including, but not limited to, community interests in each proposed division, the trend of population changes in the Northern Territory and the physical features of each proposed division.
- A quantitative trigger of 20% is already used *Electoral Act* around quota variations.

10. The precedent that exists in other jurisdictions is that an Augmented Committee (i.e. a second committee body) provides a review function to proposed redistributions and decides whether or not to invite a second objection period. For example, section 72(12) of the *Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918* (Cth) (the Commonwealth Act) specifies that the augmented Electoral Commission can invite further objections if its proposal is significantly different from the Redistribution Committee proposal.
11. As the Bill proposes to remove the current Augmented Redistribution Committee, in line with the recommendations of the 2016 Election Report, the decision to hold a second objection period would rest solely with the Redistribution Committee.
12. The single Redistribution Committee will retain its discretion to determine whether a second redistribution period will be invited across a range of qualitative factors under s145B(3) of the Bill. However, it was considered inappropriate for the single Redistribution Committee to decide what 'significantly different' means in terms of the impact of its decision relating to the number of electors added or removed from a particular Division, in the absence of an Augmented Committee to arbitrate this decision.

13. A quantitative trigger provides a more objective and transparent approach which prescribes a requirement for a second objection period to be called in relation to the number of electors added or removed as a result of the redistribution.
14. Exceptional circumstances clauses have been included in the Bill in relation to the quantitative trigger to create an additional safeguard to its application. While the Redistribution Committee is required to invite a second objection period if the 15% trigger is met, the Bill at section 145B(2) does not require the Redistribution Committee to hold a second objection period if it is of the opinion that (a) holding a second objection period would cause major inconvenience or have other serious consequences (e.g. delay to the next election), or (b) it is the only feasible option because there has been a natural disaster or other extraordinary demographic movement (e.g. the closure of a mine).

***b. What modelling was undertaken to arrive at the prescribed 15% trigger for the second objection period?***

### Key points

- The statistical trigger in relation to the impact on the number of electors, was set at 15% based on the most recent data available, including previous redistribution reports, maps, and other electoral resources.
- This measure provides an appropriate balance between providing a safeguard for public participation in the redistribution process and avoiding an administratively burdensome process.

15. Data used for modelling and policy research was based on the data available through previous redistribution reports, redistribution maps and other resources available on the Northern Territory Electoral Commission's website.
16. Alternative policy options were also considered in terms of the concept of 'significantly different' (a term used in the Commonwealth Act) and whether a qualitative definition could be included in the Bill to guide the Redistribution Committee.

17. This research confirmed that a qualitative term to define 'significant difference' in relation to the impact on the number of electors in a redistribution process is complex and could encompass a number of variables, including:
- geographical changes (i.e. boundary changes) to divisions;
  - changing the number of electors in divisions;
  - changing the names of divisions;
  - adding new divisions or removing existing divisions; and
  - transferring electors between divisions.
18. In the absence of a simple qualitative definition that would indicate a 'significant change', relating to the number of electors affected by a redistribution, the option of a quantitative (i.e. numerical) trigger was preferred. Modelling around the concept of a quantitative trigger identified the following measurable indications of change:
- the geographic area of divisions (e.g. 6 km<sup>2</sup> added / 42 km<sup>2</sup> removed); and
  - the electors transferred (e.g. 100 electors added / 700 electors removed).
19. As the object of a redistribution is to ensure there are an equal number of electors in all divisions, it was considered that the number of electors added / removed from divisions would be the best indication of a significant change between the second proposed redistribution and the first proposed redistribution.
20. A geographic measure of change was excluded from further consideration as it would be of limited value given that electors are not evenly dispersed in the Northern Territory. A large geographic change may only affect a small number of electors in remote divisions. In urban divisions, a small re-drawing the boundary line (e.g. adding a street) may affect a large number of electors.
21. In relation to the electors transferred as an indication of significant change, the following different amounts quantitative triggers were considered:
- 10% of electors added / removed;
  - 15% of electors added / removed; and
  - 20% of electors added / removed.
22. As at 31 August 2018 there were **138 801 electors** in the Northern Territory (source: Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) website<sup>2</sup>). With 25 divisions in the Northern Territory, this would mean a quota of approximately 5 552 electors.

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<sup>2</sup> ([https://aec.gov.au/Enrolling\\_to\\_vote/Enrolment\\_stats/type/2018/08.htm](https://aec.gov.au/Enrolling_to_vote/Enrolment_stats/type/2018/08.htm)).

23. In any given division, a 15% quantitative trigger would be appropriately 830 electors added / removed; a 10% trigger would be around 555 electors added / removed; and a 20% trigger would be around 1 110 electors.
24. During consultation, the Electoral Commissioner observed that a 10% trigger is too low and would likely require a second objection period to be held for many redistributions in the Northern Territory creating, an administratively burdensome process.
25. It was noted that a 20% quantitative threshold is already used in the *Electoral Act* in relation to indicating the upper and low limits of the quota (section 140(1)). If the number of electors in a division either falls short of or exceeds 20% of the quota in the time period between a finalised redistribution and the next election, the Administrator can call for another redistribution to be conducted (section 138(3)).
26. Based on the modelling undertaken, and on the basis that a 10% trigger may lead to a second objection period in most redistributions and a 20% quantitative threshold currently exists in the Act; a 15% trigger (approximately 830 electors added / removed based on AEC data at 31 August 2018) was considered an appropriate safeguard for public participation in the redistribution process.
27. **Figure A** provides a visual comparison of the current redistribution process and the proposed process, including a second objection period.

**c. Can you comment on the Commissioner's concern that, as drafted, section 145B(1), could potentially compel the Redistribution Committee to undertake an additional objection period in circumstances where it is unlikely to benefit the redistribution process resulting in unnecessary delays to the finalisation of boundaries?**

### Key points

- The value of a second objection period rests in the opportunity it provides for a consultative redistribution process. There is benefit in seeking feedback from the community on electoral changes which impact them as voters, even if it does not result in a change.
- This benefit is considered to outweigh the cost of any potential delays, which as demonstrated in the response to Question 3a, are not likely to be significant and will not impact on the overall election process.

28. There is a possibility that no objections of importance (or no objections at all) are received during a second objection period. However, this does not take into account the value of allowing *the opportunity* for a second objection period. There is a benefit in seeking feedback even if it does not result in a change, and a lack of objections may indicate general community acceptance for the proposed boundaries.

29. The opportunity for a second objection period underscores the value of opinions and interests of electors in the Northern Territory. It ensures that when there is an indication of a significant change (whether it be through changes to the number of electors being added or removed between proposed divisions, or other factors), all electors will have the chance to participate in further objections.
30. If there are no major objections in the second objection period, this would mean that the second proposed redistribution would likely become the final redistribution without any further administrative delay. If there are major objections, this justifies the second objection period and supports a transparent and consultative redistribution process.
31. Refer to Question 3 a. for further discussion.

**2. The Electoral Commissioner also suggested that if a quantitative measure is to be used to determine whether a second objection phase is required, proposed sections 145B(1)(a) and (b) should be amended such that the 15% change in total electors in a division refers to both the second proposed redistribution as compared to the first proposed redistribution or the existing boundaries; thereby reducing the circumstances where the Redistribution Committee would be required to conduct an unnecessary additional public objection phase.**

***a. Can you clarify for the Committee why the 15% change in total electors in a division only refers to the second proposed redistribution as compared to the first proposed redistribution?***

### Key points

- Available electoral data indicates there is always significant variation between a second proposed redistribution and existing boundaries in the Northern Territory variations from the quota.
- As a result, a comparison of the second proposed redistribution to the existing boundaries is not considered to be a robust indication of unexpected change in a redistribution.

32. Minimising the number of electors being transferred between the final redistribution and the existing boundaries is already covered by section 139A(e) of the Bill:

*(e) subject to paragraphs (a) to (d), changes to existing divisions should minimise the number of electors being transferred from one division to another.*

33. It is framed as a 'secondary principle' in recognition that transferring electors is often a necessity to achieve an equal spread of electors in all divisions.

34. It is generally expected that significant changes will always need to occur between the existing boundaries and the final boundaries in the Northern Territory. As there are four years between redistributions, large variations from the quota may have occurred due to shifts in the population. For example, the division of Braitling is currently above the quota and will likely require significant boundary changes at the 2019 redistribution.
35. According to data detailed in the 2015 Redistribution Report, significant change occurred between the existing 2011 boundaries and the final 2015 boundaries, as follows:
- the majority (17 out of 25 divisions) had a quantitative change over 15%;
  - eight of those 17 divisions had a quantitative change of over 50%;
  - in the division of Fong Lim, 4 780 electors (98% of the total number of existing electors) were transferred in / out;
  - a new division was added (Spillet); and
  - an existing division was removed (Greatorex).

Refer to **Table 1**.

36. In contrast, significant change is not expected to be the norm between a first proposed redistribution and a second proposed redistribution for the following reasons:
- a first proposed redistribution is already informed by public consultation from suggestions (30 days) and comments on those suggestions (14 days);
  - it is expected that if divisions are to be added, removed or renamed this would already be introduced in the first proposed redistribution; and
  - there would be only 12 weeks between the first proposed redistribution and the second proposed redistribution (based on the 2015 timeframe).
37. The Electoral Commissioner's submission provides the example of the division of Sanderson at the 2015 redistribution. Although a second objection period may not have been triggered by Sanderson, there are 17 other divisions in which significant change occurred.



**b. To what extent would the amendment proposed by the Electoral Commissioner impact on the operation of the Act?**

**Key points**

- Including an additional calculation, as proposed by the Electoral Commissioner, which compares the existing boundaries to the proposed redistribution, would add unnecessary complexity to the legislation.
- The additional comparison would provide no practical difference to whether the quantitative trigger applied or not.

38. A quantitative trigger should be simple so there is clarity for Redistribution Committee in its application. Additionally, it should be framed in such a way to allow members of the general public to easily understand possible scenarios where there might be a second objection period.
39. It was confirmed through discussion with the Electoral Commissioner on 8 October 2018 that the intent of the Commissioner's submission to the Social Policy Scrutiny Committee (dated 18 September 2018) was to suggest a broader quantitative trigger so that a 15% change has to be met by **both** (a) the second proposed redistribution compared to the first proposed redistribution **and** (b) the second proposed redistribution as compared to the existing boundaries.
40. For example, if a second proposed redistribution indicates a **5% change to existing boundaries** and **45% change to the first proposed redistribution**, this would not require a second objection period under the Electoral Commissioner's proposal. However, there is a significant proposed change and it would be in the public interest to hold a second objection period.
41. Including this additional comparison and calculation adds complexity to the quantitative trigger. For the reasons outlined in the response to Question 2 a. (above), this additional calculation is not expected to provide any difference to the practical application of the quantitative trigger as currently proposed in the Bill.
42. Based on data in the 2015 Redistribution Report (Table 1 refers), the additional test suggested by the Electoral Commissioner to compare the existing and final boundaries would be triggered in the majority of cases. As a result, comparing the first and second redistribution (as outlined in the Bill) would be the only determining variable. Therefore, there is no benefit in having the additional calculation as proposed by the Commissioner.

3. Pursuant to section 138 of the *Electoral Act*, the redistribution process must start as soon as practicable after 30 months following the polling day for a general election. The Committee understands that the current two stage process takes approximately six months to complete. This timetable provides political parties approximately twelve months to undertake their pre-selection process. Given that a second objection period would result in an estimated delay of at least six weeks until boundaries are finalised, the Electoral Commissioner has recommended that commencement of the redistribution process be brought forward by six months.

a. *What consideration was given to the impact of an additional objection period on the timetable for the redistribution process and subsequent pre-selection process?*

### Key points

- Noting variations of up to six weeks (as outlined in Election Reports from 2004 to 2015) to complete the redistribution process in previous years, a second objection period is not expected to have a detrimental impact on the electoral process which is expected to add a further six weeks.
- Removing the Augmented Redistribution Committee is expected to reduce the time taken to complete the redistribution process as it eliminates the duplication of technical and administrative processes associated with two committees.

43. The Bill proposes to remove the duplication of technical and administrative processes through having both a Redistribution Committee and an Augmented Redistribution Committee to deal with redistributions.

44. The simplification to one Redistribution Committee is expected to reduce the time taken to undertake redistributions as it eliminates the unnecessary duplication of technical and administrative processes. For example, since the appointed member of the Redistribution Committee will now have oversight of all processes, this is likely to streamline internal committee discussions and the process as a whole.

45. Below are the three possible scenarios that detail how the proposed quantitative trigger may impact the timetable for the 2019 redistribution

**Scenario A – A second objection period is not held**

46. If a second proposed redistribution does not meet the 15% trigger, it would become the final redistribution almost seven months after the start of the redistribution process (just over 11 months prior to the next election) (refer Scenario A, Table 2).

**Scenario B – A second objection period is held**

47. If objections are received in the second objection period, this requires the Redistribution Committee to re-consider the boundaries which is likely to cause a delay to the final redistribution. The Electoral Commissioner's submission projects a six-week delay to the overall redistribution process caused by a second objection period (whether triggered by the quantitative trigger or at the discretion of the Redistribution Committee).

48. This means the redistribution will be finalised up to 8 months after the start of the redistribution process (just over 10 months prior to the next election). If no (or only minor) objections are received, this is expected to take less time (refer Scenario B, Table 2).

49. Noting variations of up to six weeks (as outlined in Election Reports from 2004 to 2015) to complete the redistribution process in previous years, the proposal is not expected to have a detrimental impact on the electoral process.

50. It is also noted that additional time will be recouped in the proposed process through the previous timeframes that applied to establish the Augmented Redistribution Committee, and for the Augmented Committee to undertake its deliberations.

51. Refer to **Table 2** for a comparison of redistribution process timeframes.

52. Refer to Question 3 b. (below) in relation to the pre-selection process.

*b. Can you comment on the Electoral Commissioner's proposal that the redistribution process be brought forward by six months to accommodate an additional objection period?*

### Key points

- Bringing the redistribution process forward by six months would not provide the Redistribution Committee with the most recent data to determine population trends and to calculate the quota, which is a core element of the redistribution process.
- Finalising the redistribution too early (e.g. 18 months before an election) may lead to a greater discrepancy from the quota at the next election and may potentially undermine the one vote, one value principle.

53. Bringing redistribution processes forward by six months is not recommended since it may threaten the overall object of the redistribution. The object of the redistribution (section 139) is to ensure an equal number of electors in each proposed division at the time of the next election. It is considered the primary aim of electoral boundary redistributions to support the democratic principle of one vote, one value.
54. The Northern Territory has the smallest population in Australia with some of the largest population movements. As a result, there is a high risk of variance from the quota in individual divisions. If a redistribution is finalised too early (e.g. 18 months prior to an election) this may lead to greater discrepancy from the quota at the next election and can potentially undermine the one vote, one value principle.
55. The timing of the final redistribution must provide an appropriate balance between allowing political parties sufficient time to undertake their pre-selection process and ensuring that the redistribution has been informed by the most recent data so that the statistical projections relied on by the Redistribution Committee are up-to-date and as accurate as possible.

## Appendix A. Glossary

<p><b>Quota</b></p>	<p>The calculation of the total number of electors divided by the number of seats (electoral divisions) in the Northern Territory (s13(4) of the <i>Self-Government Act</i>).</p> <p>The quota is used to ensure an equal number of electors in all 25 divisions and safeguards the principle of one vote, one value.</p> <p>The Redistribution Committee is to also ensure that divisions remain inside the quota range when considering where to set the electoral boundaries (s140(1)).</p> <p>If the number of electors in each division falls short of or exceeds 20% of the quota, the Administrator has the power to call another redistribution process (s138(3)).</p>
<p><b>Elector</b></p>	<p>A person on the electoral roll (i.e. living at an address in the Northern Territory) who is entitled to vote.</p>
<p><b>Redistribution Committee</b></p>	<p>The committee body that undertakes the redistribution process. The Bill amends section 332 so that the Redistribution Committee will have an additional member, the appointed member, for a total of four members.</p>
<p><b>Augmented Redistribution Committee</b></p>	<p>The committee body under the current Act that is to be abolished by the proposed Bill. Its function and role is to provide a review of the proposals of the Redistribution Committee.</p>
<p><b>Appointed member</b></p>	<p>The Chair of the Redistribution Committee proposed by the Bill. The appointed member is a judicial appointee that has a casting vote as well as a deliberative vote. The Bill prescribes further eligibility requirements for the appointed member.</p>

Figure A: Methodology of the current and proposed redistribution processes

LEGEND: ● = 500 electors ■ = proposed electors added




Table 1: Electors transferred – 2015 Redistribution Process

LEGEND: ■ 15% trigger met | ■ division added / removed

Division name	Total electors (2011 (existing boundaries) <sup>1</sup> )	Total electors (2015 final boundaries) <sup>2</sup>	Transfers in	Transfers out	Total transfers	Quantitative difference
Arafura	5368	4698	0	670	670	12.5%
Araluen	4341	5459	2189	1071	3260	75.1%
Arnhem	4906	4972	1516	1450	2966	60.5%
Barkly	4923	4981	63	5	68	1.4%
Blain	6478	5163	285	1600	1885	29.1%
Braitling	4170	5633	2338	875	3213	77.1%
Brennan	6148	5219	0	929	929	15.1%
Casuarina	5388	5211	691	868	1559	28.9%
Daly	5403	5033	278	648	926	17.1%
Drysdale	5833	5345	1495	1983	3478	59.6%
Fannie Bay	5670	5437	1793	2026	3819	67.4%
Fong Lim	4843	5243	2590	2190	4780	98.7%
Goyder	5414	5244	648	818	1466	27.1%
Greatorex	4131	0	0	4131	4131	100.0%
Johnston	5320	5049	868	1139	2007	37.7%
Karama	5090	5090	0	0	0	0.0%
Katherine	5004	5004	0	0	0	0.0%
Namatjira	5260	5133	1550	1677	3227	61.3%
Nelson	4507	5325	818	0	818	18.1%
Nhulunbuy	4019	5469	1450	0	1450	36.1%
Nightcliff	5235	5235	0	0	0	0.0%
Port Darwin	5353	4789	22	586	608	11.4%
Sanderson	5435	5435	0	0	0	0.0%
Spillett	0	4268	4268	0	4268	-
Stuart	4538	5033	1677	1182	2859	63.0%
Wanguri	5717	5026	0	691	691	12.1%
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>128494</b>	<b>128494</b>	<b>24539</b>	<b>24539</b>	<b>49078</b>	

<sup>1</sup> Based on enrolments at 16 July 2015 (Appendix C, Augmented Redistribution Committee Report 2015)<sup>2</sup> Based on enrolments at 16 July 2015 (Appendix C, Augmented Redistribution Committee Report 2015)

**Table 2: Comparison of redistribution process timeframes**

**LEGEND:** | ■ Redistribution start / end date | ■ Redistribution process finalised | ■ Steps removed | ■ Steps added

Steps	2015 Redistribution Process				Steps	Proposed 2019 Redistribution Process			
	Processes	Act references	Prescribed timeframes	Recorded dates <sup>1</sup>		Processes	Bill / Act references	Prescribed timeframes	Projected dates
1.	Inviting suggestions	Section 141	30 days	25 February 2015 ▼ 30 days ▼ 27 March 2015	1.	Inviting suggestions	Section 141	30 days	20 February 2019 ▼ 30 days ▼ 22 March 2019
2.	Inviting comments on suggestions	Section 142	14 days	▼ 3 days ▼ 30 March 2015 ▼ 14 days ▼ 13 April 2015	2.	Inviting comments on suggestions	Section 142	14 days	▼ 3 days ▼ 25 March 2019 ▼ 14 days ▼ 8 April 2019
3.	Preparing proposed redistribution	Sections 143, 144	As soon as practicable	▼ 64 days ▼ 16 June 2015	3.	Preparing first proposed redistribution	Sections 143, 144	As soon as practicable	▼ 64 days ▼ 11 June 2019
4.	Establishing the Augmented Redistribution Committee	Sections 334 - 339	-	-	Duration of Redistribution Process – 6 months and 22 days				
5.	Inviting objections on proposed redistribution	Section 145	30 days	16 June 2015 ▼ 30 days ▼ 16 July 2015					
6.	Considering objections and final redistribution	Sections 146, 147	As soon as practicable	▼ 62 days ▼ 16 September 2015 <sup>2</sup>	5.	Considering objections and preparing second proposed redistribution	Section 145A	As soon as practicable	▼ 62 days ▼ 11 September 2019
<div style="display: flex; align-items: center; justify-content: center;"> <div style="font-size: 2em; margin-right: 10px;">}</div> <div style="text-align: center;">6 weeks</div> </div>					6.	Scenario A: <sup>3</sup> Under 15% trigger or would major inconvenience or is the only feasible option = Final redistribution	Sections 145B(1), (2), 147(1A)(b)		11 September 2019
					<b>Estimated duration of Redistribution Process if a second objection period is not held – 6 months and 22 days</b>				
					7.	Scenario B: <sup>4</sup> Over 15% trigger or Redistribution Committee is of the opinion that it involves significant change = Second objection period	Section 145B(1), (3), (4)	14 days	11 September 2019 ▼ 14 days ▼ 25 September 2019
					8.	Considering further objections and final redistribution	Section 147(1A)(a)	4 weeks (as per Electoral Commissioner submission)	▼ 28 days ▼ <sup>5</sup> 23 October 2019 <sup>6</sup>
					<b>Estimated duration of Redistribution Process if a second objection period is held – 8 months and 3 days</b>				

<sup>1</sup> See *Augmented Redistribution Committee Report 2015*, Appendix A (page 31).

<sup>2</sup> As a comparison to previous redistribution processes: the 2011 redistribution, 5 months and 16 days; the 2008 redistribution, 5 months and 28 days; the 2004 redistribution, 6 months and 26 days.

<sup>3</sup> Refer to response to Question 3 a.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Based on the Electoral Commissioner's projected timeframe of an additional 6 weeks (including 14 days for the second objection period). If no (or only minor) objections are received, this step is expected to take less time.

<sup>6</sup> 2019 projected timeframes are based on 2015 redistribution timeframes and the Electoral Commissioner's submission. Scenario B would mean a projected redistribution process of eight months and three days. However, streamlining the process from the current two-committee structure to a one-committee structure is expected to allow the 2019 redistribution process to be completed with greater efficiency.